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Iketani, Shotaro; Yokobori, Tomohiko; Ishikawa, Joji; Yasuhara, Toshiyuki*; Kozawa, Toshiyuki*; Takaizumi, Hirohide*; Momma, Takeshi*; Kurosawa, Shingo*; Iseda, Hirokatsu; Kishimoto, Katsumi; et al.
JAEA-Review 2018-016, 46 Pages, 2018/12
JAEA-Review-2018-016.pdf:12.79MB
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) adopts melting process for the waste processing and packaging method of radioactive miscellaneous solid waste in NSRI because melting process is effective in radioactivity evaluation, volume reduction, and stabilization treatment. Metal melting processing facilities, Incinerator, and Nonmetal melting processing facilities (hereinafter referred to as melting process facilities) have taken lots of safety measures, including measures for preventing the recurrence of the fire accidents. To exchange opinions and discuss the validity of these measures and so on with internal personnel and external experts, "Discussions on Melting Process Facilities" was held. As a document collection, this paper summarizes presentation materials of discussion meetings. Presentation materials describe "Outline of AVRF", "Safety measures in the melting facilities in WVRF", "Operation management of the melting facilities in WVRF", "Comparison of the past accident cases between facilities in and outside Japan and WVRF", and "Introduction of past accident cases and safety measures in other facilities from each committee".
Takada, Junichi; Hayashi, Shiro*; Watanabe, Koji; Takita, Koji*; Tsukamoto, Michio; Tashiro, Shinsuke; Abe, Hitoshi*; Uchiyama, Gunzo*
JAERI-Tech 2002-102, 87 Pages, 2003/01
JAERI-Tech-2002-102.pdf:3.27MB
no abstracts in English
Koyama, Tomozo; ; Omori, Eiichi; ; ; Shibata, Atsuhiro; Shigetome, Yoshiaki
JNC TN8410 99-027, 423 Pages, 1999/12
The bituminization demonstration facility of Tokai Reprocessig Plant had a fire and explosion incident. The cause of the incident was investigated. Also, the facility condition and release of radioactive materials were evaluated. The cause of the fire and subsequent explosion was determined in a two year investigation. The main cause of the fire was that the temperature of the bituminized product rose to an unusually high temperature by a physical heating phenomena inside the extruder, which was caused by the lowering the feed rate of liquid waste. A moderate chemical reaction in the bituminized product continued and consequently the bituminized product overheated and ignited. The cause of the explosion was the accumulation of flammable gases generated from insufficiently extinguished bituminized product in the filling room in which the ventilation system had been shut down. The flammable gas was ignited by another bituminized product that overheated to the flash point temperature. This report details the condition of the facility before and after the incident, cause of the incident, and an evaluated amount of released radioactive materials.
Miura, Akihiko;
JNC TN8410 99-046, 35 Pages, 1999/10
Judging from several evidences which are operators' testimony, observation result, and so on, the "Committee for an Investigation into the Fire and Explosion Incident at the BDF of the Reprocessing plant of Tokai Works" concluded another fire incident occurred in the filling room (R152) after the explosion (hereafter called second fire incident). This report explains the simulation result of second fire incident. Calculated air temperature and radiation intensity are used another calculations that indicate the thermal influence from the fire name to the extruder or neighboring drums. About second fire incident, calculated result indicates first fire occurred from the No.30104 drum that was produced in 30B or several drums including No.30104 drum. It is estimated that temperature and thermal runaway reaction was not due to fire of neighboring drum because the drum doesn't receive large influence thermally by radiation from the neighboring fire name. Each result suggests the all burnt 29B and 30B drums were filled at higher temperature than usual.
M.Azim*; Horiki, Oichiro;
JAERI-M 7632, 73 Pages, 1978/04
no abstracts in English
;
Hoken Butsuri, 2(2), p.81 - 94, 1967/00
no abstracts in English
Abe, Hitoshi; Yoshida, Kazuo; Fukasawa, Tetsuo*; Muramatsu, Ken*; Ikeda, Yasuhisa*
no journal, ,
On the basis of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, evaluation of risk of severe accident (SA) for nuclear fuel cycle facility and investigation of ensuring and improving of safety on the evaluation became urgent problem. In Reprocessing and Recycle Technology Division of Atomic Energy Society of Japan, procedure of selection of the SA on the scientific technological viewpoints for the nuclear fuel cycle facility has been investigated at Nuclear Fuel Cycle facility Severe Accident Working Group (SAWG). In this session, procedure of selection of the SA which should be considered, criterion for judgment for the selection and application example to evaluation of risk as the investigation results in SAWG will be presented.
